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In the Theaetetus,  Plato ascribes a metaphysics to relativism according to which there are  no stable objects or properties. In effect, the world dissolves and  there is nothing we can refer to in speech. En route to this revisionist  picture, Plato toys with expressions that might be suitable to talk  about a world in flux: something is no more tall than not tall, no more  cold than not cold, etc. The Greek expression used in these  formulations, ou mallon,  becomes a stock element of Pyrrhonian skepticism. My paper makes a  novel proposal by arguing that the Stoics too find a place for this  idea. The idea that something can be “no more this than that,” I argue,  is philosophically richer than is commonly assumed. It is not just a  part of radically revisionist approaches. It is a compelling dimension  of the Stoic distinction between impressions and propositions. The Stoic  wise person suspends judgment when her impressions are neither true nor  false--arguably, this concerns rather many ordinary impressions. For  the Stoics, the epistemic norms that call for such suspension of  judgment are key to leading a good life.