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Published: May 14, 2021, 1:47 a.m.

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(\u05d1\u05d1\u05dc\u05d9 \u05db\u05e8\u05d9\u05ea\u05d5\u05ea \u05d8 \u05e2'\u05d0).

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As we began the Shloshes Yimei Hagvalah

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in preparation for Matan Torah

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and reliving the events that transformed our people

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and created a unique identity for us in perpetuity\xa0

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The Issur Ben Tzvi Hersh

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Tshuvos and Poskim Shiur

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Of the Yeshiva of Newark@IDT

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offered a special halachic discussion on Geirus

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that was presented by one of the leading Jewish scholars of our day

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Rabbi Micheal J.Broyde

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\xa0professor of law at Emory University School of Law

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\xa0senior fellow and projects director

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\xa0at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion

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\xa0The Concise Code of Jewish Law for Converts

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(Second Edition forthcoming, 2021, Urim)

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Michael J. Broyde

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We are commanded to love the convert: In particular, we are directed not to cause converts to suffer in

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any way, but rather to do them good and charitably as they deserve and as we can. The converts are all

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those who have joined us from other nations and abandoned their religion and joined ours. About this

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group, the Torah [Devarim 10:19] says, \u201cLove the stranger [convert] since you were strangers.\u201d \u2013 Sefer

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HaChinuch Mitzva 431

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The mitzva of loving the convert is fundamental to this work. Most sources that discuss this mitzva indicate that

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it adds to the force of the obligation to love any Jew \u2013 to love the convert specifically. The question for a practical

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halachic work, however, is: \u201cHow should one love the convert in particular?\u201d Should one love the convert as in

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the Midrashic parable of the stag joining the flock of sheep, recognizing that the convert is always an outsider

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and will never exactly fit in? Or should one love the convert as a long-lost member of a family, who needs to be

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reunited with the community as if the convert were always a family member, lest, out of loneliness, they return

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to their original community?

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This work adopts both of these alternatives as inherent to the complexity of the mitzva of loving the convert \u2013 to

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love the convert because a convert is different and to love the convert by helping them fit in and not be different.

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The first way of loving calls for heightening the pace and the degree of integration of the convert within the

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Jewish community, so that they are no longer perceived as a convert. This complements one of the basic purposes

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of the mitzva to love the convert: to make sure that the convert remains part of the Jewish community and does

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not feel out of place or like a stranger. This is the basic message of Rambam\u2019s famous letter to Rabbi Ovadia (the

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Convert) directing him to pray in a similar manner as all other Jews. Thus, in all situations in which there is a

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dispute about the mandates of Jewish law, this work follows this halachic factor in preferring to adopt the

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normative Jewish law view which brings the convert to further integration into the Jewish people. The view that

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highlights the convert\u2019s status as an outsider is generally disfavored, while that which encourages integration is

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generally favored. As Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (cited below in the introduction) taught: The mitzva to love the

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convert obligates us to resolve disputed Jewish laws (where a convert is involved) in a way that further helps the

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convert find their place within the community.

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However, in certain situations, the convert\u2019s status as a stranger within our community creates an affirmative need

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of assistance navigating law, custom, and nuance. Ignoring that fact in the name of purely formalist equal status

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\u2013 pretending that the convert is not a convert \u2013 is not truly loving. For example, Shulchan Aruch (OC 529:2)

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records that when the Jewish festivals (chagim) arrive, there is a particular duty to reach out to invite the convert

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into one\u2019s home for festival meals. When all others are celebrating with family, one must manifest the love of the

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convert in particular by acknowledging that they need special attention. To ignore a person\u2019s status as a convert

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when everybody else is family-focused does not manifest love and integration of the convert as an insider; it

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simply causes the convert to focus on his family-less status. This work recognizes this reality and takes into

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account that the duty to love the convert sometimes requires highlighting the fact that this person is a convert.

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This is the two-sided nature of the duty to love the convert: One must both welcome the convert as an outsider,

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as well as do one\u2019s best to help them cease being an outsider. This work is aware of both ways of fulfilling the

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obligation to love the convert and factors them both into its determinations of normative Jewish law.

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Modern Jewish life in America has a number of unique characteristics, almost unprecedented historically. One of

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those unique features is the social ease with which one can convert to Judaism. People can and do change religions

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without almost any social, economic, or political complications. Indeed, studies show that people in America

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change their faiths frequently, and conversion to Judaism is no exception. This is a new historical reality of

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American Jewish life, and is still quite different from the reality in other parts of the world.

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The present work addresses this new reality by filling a lacuna in the halachic literature both for converts and for

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fellow Jews relating to converts. It collects the many different halachic issues that relate to the status of converts

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after their conversion. It discusses all the cases in which the halachic rules are different (or even where some

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authorities are of the opinion that the halachic rules are different) for a convert than they are for a born-Jew, or

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for how a born-Jew is to relate to a convert rather than to a born-Jew. It offers normative rulings that are applicable

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today for all of these questions.

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Six Undergirding Questions

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The halachic issues in which the rules for a convert or for other Jews relating to converts are not the same as for,

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or toward, a born-Jew can be divided into six questions:

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1. THE CONVERT\u2019S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN

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There are certain mitzvot that are applied in toto differently to a convert, since the family of origin is not Jewish.

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For example: How should one respect and honor their Gentile parents? Must a convert mourn for their parents in

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the same way that a born-Jew does? Such questions apply no matter how recently a person converted and no

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matter how well-integrated they are within the Jewish community. The basic question here is how to approach

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the unusual family situation of a convert.

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2. THE UNIQUE OBLIGATION TO LOVE A CONVERT

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There are mitzvot incumbent on born-Jews in their relationships with converts. The most striking is the special

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obligation to love a convert. The duty to love the convert is complex in that love sometimes calls for singling out

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a convert for special attention, and not doing so at other times, depending on how the convert will respond to that

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unique attention. The core question here is when to identify or single out a convert as such, and when to avoid

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doing so.

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3. TRANSITION ISSUES IN BEING A JEW WHO HAD BEEN A GENTILE

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There are some transitional questions present in conversions, reflecting the fact that a person who was previously

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a Gentile becomes, in a single moment, Jewish and obligated in Jewish Law. For example: May a convert eat the

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kosher food they cooked the morning before the conversion, or is it prohibited to the convert as a form of bishul

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akum (food cooked by a Gentile)? What are the prayer and blessing obligations of someone who converts in the

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middle of the time specified for performance of time-bound mitzvot, such as in the middle of the day, in the

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middle of sefira, in the middle of Chanuka, and so on? The complicated question here is how to handle the

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situation in which a convert joins Judaism in the middle of an ongoing mitzva, or in which they must relate to

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their past self. (Fortunately, although these issues are beguiling, they are also transitory.)

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4. MARRIAGE LAWS FOR A CONVERT

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There are certain people whom a convert may marry that a born-Jew may not marry, and there are certain people

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whom a convert may not marry that a born-Jew may marry. For example: a convert may marry a mamzer, and a

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female convert may not marry a Kohen. The core question is whom Jews who are converts may marry, since

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converts are not Kohanim, Levites, or Israelites.

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5. LIMITATIONS ON CONVERTS HOLDING POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY

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Many societies exclude those members who were not born into the society from holding some powerful offices.

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(One such society is that of the United States.) In parallel: the Torah tells us that a convert may not become a king

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of the Jewish nation, and the Talmud rules that a convert may not serve in any position of binding coercive

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authority. For example: a convert may not serve on certain kinds of rabbinical courts. See CM 7 and 8. The core

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question is one of contemporary Jewish law: what are the modern day offices (or officers, or holders of certain

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titles) that fit into this Talmudic rule?

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6. A CONVERT AND PRAYERS THAT SPEAK OF ANCESTRAL JUDAISM

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There is an ongoing dispute as to whether and when a convert recites specific parts of the traditional prayers that

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reference Jewish ancestors or born Jewishness. For example: Does a convert bless God for having been made a

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Jew (shelo asani goy)? The core questions are when and why a convert is called upon to identify themself in

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prayer as a descendant of the earliest forefathers of the Jews, or as a descendent of the slaves redeemed from

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Egypt, and when and why to identify themself as an outsider by birth.

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Four Undergirding Principles Regarding Converts

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There are four principles through which these questions are filtered:

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1. Love: There is a special obligation to love the convert, and there is a special obligation not to allow a

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convert to suffer because they converted. There are many explanations for this mitzva. The two primary

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ones are love of the convert and fear that the convert might abandon their Judaism for their original faith.

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The following midrash offers a parable to explain the obligation to love the convert as a form of endearment:

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A king has many flocks of sheep... and one day a stag appears and joins the sheep. The stag grazes with

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the sheep and returns with them at night, as if he were a sheep. When the shepherds tell the king of the

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stag... the king takes great pride and interest in it and ensures that the shepherds treat the stag with special

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care. The shepherds question the king, asking \u201cyou have thousands of animals over which you take no

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personal interest... so why do you care so much about this one animal?\u201d The king answers them, \u201cMy

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sheep have only this flock to join, and cannot leave, but this stag has the whole world to choose from,

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yet he chose my flock. He surely deserves my special attention and care.\u201d

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The midrash concludes that we, as the Jewish people, should give tremendous credit to the convert who has chosen

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to leave their family and their people to join our ranks. This is why the convert deserves special consideration and

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care. Other sources further attribute this mitzva to the fear that if converts are not loved, they might abandon

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Judaism to return to the community that loves them. Some midrashim thus explain certain rules as grounded in

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the concern \u201clest the convert return to their old faith.\u201d Even these sources, however, still recognize that the

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obligation to love the stranger in our midst is part of the legacy of Jewish slavery in Egypt and of our having been

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gerim in that setting. Regardless of which concern is more paramount to a given reader of this work, it is clear

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that there is a special obligation to act with particular kindness to converts as a way of showing love. For example:

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the obligation includes a directive to help a convert celebrate the festivals, when they might feel most alone.

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Furthermore: according to many sources, the Biblical repetition of the injunction against oppressing a convert

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reinforces the prohibition against oppressing the convert, both in financial matters and in non-financial matters.

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Moreover, many halachic authorities are of the view that there is even an obligation to help a convert earn a living

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with ease.

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2. Arevut: Since a convert is basically viewed as identical to a born-Jew, converts can mutually participate

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with fellow Jews in discharging religious obligations for each other even when they have already

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fulfilled their own obligation (called in Jewish law the principle of arevut). Although this matter is in

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dispute, the general halachic consensus is that a convert can fulfill the obligation of others, even after they

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have fulfilled their own. This work accepts that view.

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While there are many proofs for this approach, suffice it to say that this is the consensus of halachic authorities.

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It is also driven by the categorical insistence of many authorities that a convert may lead a congregation in prayer

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(be motzi others as sheliach tzibbur); if a convert were not included in arevut, this rule of allowing a convert to

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be a sheliach tzibbur/chazzan would need many caveats and modifications. In addition, this approach is consistent

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with Rabbi Feinstein\u2019s obligation that we love the convert by being lenient on matters that could otherwise

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stigmatize them.

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3. Minhagim: A convert is free to choose which set of Jewish customs (minhagim) the convert wishes to

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adopt (Ashkenaz, Sephard, Edot Hamizrach, etc.). A convert is under no obligation to adopt the

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customs of their biological homeland (so a Gentile born in Ukraine need not adopt minhag Ashkenaz) as

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long as the convert adopts an existent halachic culture.

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The same point is true in matters of hashkafa (ideology): A convert may choose any Orthodox ideology,

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spanning the breadth of the Orthodox community. Even if a convert\u2019s biological father is Jewish, the convert

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still need not adopt his father\u2019s ancestral family practices. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach does note that a

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convert should not adopt a mosaic of unique customs from varied communities. Rather a convert should choose

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a community to join, and adopt that community\u2019s practices.

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4. \u201cA convert is like a newborn child\u201d ( ger shenitgayer kekatan shenolad ): This principle is a limited

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one. It means only that a convert loses (from a Jewish law perspective) their biological and marital

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relationships with their prior Gentile family. As a matter of Jewish law, the convert technically has no

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mother, father, siblings, or spouse.

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This principle explains why a convert\u2019s halachic relationship with their family is sometimes different than that of

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a born-Jew with theirs. However, this principle has very limited application: an adult convert is not \u201cborn again\u201d

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at conversion. The convert does not have to wait thirteen years to become a bar-mitzva, or twelve years to become

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a bat-mitzva. The convert has to repay any money that they owed at the time of conversion, and continues to own

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any property that they owned prior to their conversion. In short: the convert is not a newborn child for most

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matters of Jewish law. Furthermore, as this work will show many times and in many places, a convert is not

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prohibited from having a relationship with their prior family, although Jewish law is concerned with that prior

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relationship being used to entice the convert to revert to their prior religion. These principles form the basis of

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many of the rules and decisions found throughout this work, and are not necessarily repeated every time that they

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are applicable.

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Two Key Factors in Deciding Normative Jewish Law (Halacha)

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Most of the topics discussed in this work are drawn from disputes by post-medieval rabbinic sages

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(Achronim), by medieval sages (Rishonim), and even by sages in the Talmud itself. Thus, in order to reach

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practical conclusions, we have utilized two key factors to guide us.

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FIRST KEY FACTOR:

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This book\u2019s conclusions are reached through conventional analyses widely used for many halachic disputes,

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the details of which are beyond the scope of this introduction. The two of these guidelines relevant to this

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work are: Ashkenazi norm is generally followed when matters are disputed between Ashkenazim and

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Sephardim (although we also note Sephardic practice), and when the Aruch Hashulchan or Mishnah Berurah

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resolves a dispute, this work is inclined to follow their resolution over that of other poskim in that era.

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SECOND KEY FACTOR:

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We have always granted great weight to the obligation to love the convert. As Rabbi Moshe Feinstein states,

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this mitzva affects how one resolves halachic questions that affect a convert. He notes simply:

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\u05db\u05de\u05d5 \u05e9\u05e8\u05e8\u05d4 \u05e9\u05dc \u05d1\u05e2\u05d4'\u05d1 \u05e2\u05dc \u05e4\u05d5\u05e2\u05dc\u05d9\u05d5, \u05e9\u05d0\u05d9\u05df \u05d6\u05d4 \u05de\u05e2\u05d9\u05df \u05de\u05d9\u05e0\u05d5\u05d9 \u05dc\u05e9\u05e8\u05e8\u05d4 \u05db\u05dc\u05dc. \u05d5\u05dc\u05e4\u05d9 \u05d6\u05d4 \u05de\u05e9\u05e8\u05d5\u05ea \u05d0\u05dc\u05d5 \u05d0\u05d9\u05e0\u05dd \u05d0\u05dc\u05d0 \u05db\u05de\u05d9\u05dc\u05d5\u05d9 \u05ea\u05e4\u05e7\u05d9\u05d3 \u05d5\u05db\u05e2\u05e0\u05d9\u05d9\u05df \u05e9\u05dc

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\u05e2\u05e1\u05e7. \u05d5\u05d0\u05d9\u05df \u05dc\u05d3\u05de\u05d5\u05ea \u05d6\u05d4 \u05dc\u05de\u05e9'\u05db \u05d1\u05d0\u05d2'\u05de \u05d9\u05d5'\u05d3 \u05d7\u05dc\u05e7 \u05d1' \u05e1\u05d9\u05de\u05df \u05de'\u05d3 \u05d1\u05e2\u05e0\u05d9\u05df \u05de\u05d9\u05e0\u05d5\u05d9 \u05d0\u05e9\u05d4 \u05dc\u05d4\u05e9\u05d2\u05d9\u05d7 \u05dc\u05d4\u05db\u05e9\u05e8\u05d9\u05dd, \u05d3\u05d4\u05d5\u05d9 \u05de\u05d9\u05e0\u05d5\u05d9 \u05e9\u05dc \u05e9\u05e8\u05e8\u05d4.

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But, as a matter of normative practice, one should know that that mitzva to love the convert (Deut. 10:19)

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obligates us to bring them closer and to be lenient on all these matters. Therefore, after considerable

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contemplation it seems that these positions of authority are in our times examples of positions of mere

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acts of authority (serarah), since the purpose of a yeshiva is to teach students who are interested in

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studying. The fact that the authority of the principals or heads of the Yeshiva over the students includes

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the authority to expel them or deny them admission and the like, is similar to the authority of any owner

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over his workers and this has no connection to an appointment of formal serarah at all. Therefore, these

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jobs are only like a profession, or a business deal. They should not be compared to what I have written in

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Igrot Moshe YD 2:42 about the appointment of a woman as a kashrut supervisor, which is a position of

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serarah.

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It is important not to under-read this teshuva. What drives Rabbi Feinstein to the conclusion that being a rosh

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yeshiva is a mere position of employment with no more authority than the owner of any business (a far from

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obvious conclusion) is the duty to love the convert, since it directs us to be open and welcoming to converts,

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which cannot be done by excluding the convert. That is exactly why Rabbi Feinstein opens with the duty to bring

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the convert closer and connects that thought to his permissive ruling.

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Rabbi Feinstein avers that when there is more than one reasonable approach to a halachic topic that impacts a

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convert, one should adopt the view (of both the facts and the halacha) that shows love for the convert and brings

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them closer and further integrates the convert. One does this by seeking to adopt constructs that diminish the

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exclusion of a convert. When a reasonable person can see more than one halachic or logical or factual approach

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to a problem, one should adopt the approach that favors integrating the convert, since this is a fulfillment of the

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mitzva to love the convert. Of course, even Rabbi Feinstein agrees that one never adopts \u201cwrong\u201d views to allow

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a convert to be comfortable or integrated.

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Rabbi Feinstein connects the first sentence noting the duty to love the convert with the rest of the paragraph with

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the words \u05e0\u05e8\u05d0\u05d4 \u05d2\u05d3\u05d5\u05dc \u05d9\u05e9\u05d5\u05d1 \u05d0\u05d7\u05e8 \u05d5\u05dc\u05e4\u05d9\u05db\u05da\u201d) Therefore, after considerable contemplation\u201d) to tell the reader that the

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conclusion that a rosh yeshiva is not a position of authority is limited to a case where the candidate is a convert,

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due to the duty to love the convert.

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To put it in a slightly different way, the commandment to love the convert weighs down on the scales to encourage

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the resolution of any dispute in a loving way to the convert, as then another mitzva is fulfilled. Of course, this

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does not justify conduct that is a violation of Jewish Law, but it argues for accepting reasonable views (of both

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the facts and the rules) as normative that might not, in situations in which no convert is present, be accepted.

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Rabbi Feinstein\u2019s approach mandates that where there is more than one reasonable approach to a matter of Jewish

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law concerning how to conduct oneself vis-a-vis a convert, one ought to adopt the approach that manifests love

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of the convert, and not draw prejudicial distinctions between the convert and the born-Jew. This pathway is both

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reasonable as a matter of normative halacha and at the same time enables fulfillment of the positive Torah

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obligation of loving the convert. That positive commandment rests its thumb on the halachic scales to encourage

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the resolution in a loving way. Ruling in a manner that stigmatizes the convert should only be done when that is

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the sole reasonable halachic option.

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In other words, just as my teachers taught me, so does this responsum of Rabbi Feinstein teach us that the mitzva

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of loving the convert directs one to resolve halachic disputes about the proper conduct of a convert (or towards a

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convert) in the way that manifests the greatest love to the convert. We are definitely not to resolve such a dispute

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in a way that stigmatizes, shames, or humiliates a convert. The Torah obligation to love a convert is not an abstract

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duty to love. Rather, as Rabbi Feinstein notes, it creates an obligation to rule on matters of Jewish law in a way

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that allows the convert to sense that love and encourages others to manifest that love. This obligation is as real as

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the other specific obligations that Jewish law commands, such as the obligation to invite a convert for Yom Tov

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meals (OC 529), or to allow a convert to serve as a Rosh Yeshiva (CM 8).
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde is professor of law at Emory University School of Law and senior fellow and projects director at the Center for the Study of Law andReligion at Emory University. Broyde's Semicha (yoreh yoreh ve-yadin yadin) was obtained in 1991 from Yeshiva University ,he was a Dayan of the Beth Din of America, where he also served as Menahel . He was the Founding Rabbi of the Young Israel of Atlanta. Rabbi Kivelevitz discusses with Broyde aspects of his newest work Settingthe Table: An Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Rabbi Yechiel Mikhel Epstein\u2019s Arukh HaShulhan(co-authored with Shlomo Pill of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion) .The conversation serves as a cogent explication of how the Aruch HaShulchan differs essentially from the Mishna Brurah in aims and methodology. Rabbi Broyde's most recent books are Sex in the Garden: Consensual Encounters Gone Bad in Genesis(Wifpf & Stock, 2019),Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical Courts, and Christian Panels: Religious Arbitration in America and the West(Oxford Press, 2017) andA Concise Code of Jewish Law for Converts(Urim, 2017). In addition to his many books, Broydehas written more than 250 articles and book chapters on various aspects of law and religion, Jewish law, and religious ethics, as well as an often-cited article on impeachment in theHarvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.He has written on military ethics from a Jewish law view, marriage and divorce in the Jewish tradition, bioethical dilemmas from a religious view, women\u2019s rights in the Jewish tradition, the general relationship between secular and Jewish law in its many different facets. A list of his works may be found on hiswebsite.Broydehas been a visiting professor at Stanford,Hebrew University,and most recently theUniversity of Warsaw Law School in Polandand in theInterdisciplinaryCollege of Lawin Herzliya,Israel.He received a juris doctorfrom New York University and published a note on its law review. He also clerked for Judge Leonard I. Garth of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 

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