Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination
b"A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain\\nequilibrium selection in simple coordination games. In this paper we analyze and discuss\\nthe solution concept for common coordination problems as incorporated in the theory of\\nTeam Reasoning (TR). Special consideration is given to TR's concept of opportunistic\\nchoice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results\\nfrom a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular pattern of behavior in a sequence of HiLo games. A modification of the\\nstage game offered opportunities to improve on the team goal through changing this\\naccustomed pattern of behavior. Our observations throw considerable doubt on the\\nidea of opportunistic team reasoning as a guide to coordination. Contrary to what TR\\nwould predict, individuals tend to stick to accustomed behavioral patterns. Moreover,\\nwe find that individual decisions are at least partly determined by private information not accessible to all members of a team. Alternative theories of choice, in particular cognitive hierarchy theory may be more suitable to explain the observed pattern of behavior."