The new great game: how China replaced Russia in Kazakhstan and beyond

Published: Aug. 22, 2022, 4:44 p.m.

b'

What does China want with Xinjiang? Its systematic repression of the Uyghur people and other regional minorities has shocked the world, eliciting accusations of genocide from politicians and activists across the West. The Chinese Communist Party claims that its re-education camps are an anti-terrorism measure, but surely if anything is going to radicalise vast swathes of a non-Han population, it\\u2019s their forced internment and (for many) subsequent incarceration. So what is the CCP\\u2019s long term aim?
\\n
\\n
According to Raffaello Pantucci, senior associate fellow at the think tank Rusi, \\u2018the Central Government recognises that a very strong security crackdown is not necessarily going to deal with these problems in perpetuity\\u2019. Instead, \\u2018long-term stability for Xinjiang is going to come from economic prosperity\\u2019.
\\n
\\n
That\\u2019s where Central Asia comes in. On this episode, I talk to Raffaello about China\\u2019s relations with the five \\u2018Stans that sit cushioned between China (to their east) and Russia (to their north). As with China\\u2019s relationship with any developing region, Beijing is motivated by access to its significant oil and mineral resources. But there\\u2019s something special about Central Asia - Raffaello argues that it\\u2019s an extension of Beijing\\u2019s Xinjiang strategy: \\u2018It\\u2019s really about trying to improve the prosperity in this border region around Xinjiang to help improve its prosperity and stability\\u2026 If you\\u2019re going to make Xinjiang economically prosperous, you\\u2019re going to have to find a way of connecting it to the world.\\u2019\\xa0 \\xa0
\\n
\\n
Raffaello\\u2019s new book is Sinostan: China\\u2019s Inadvertent Empire, based on a decade of travel in and around the region (there were two when they started, but Raffaello\\u2019s co-author, Alexandros Petersen, died in a Taliban attack in Kabul eight years ago). As well as the Xinjiang implications, Sinostan looks at China\\u2019s oil and gas trade with these resource-rich countries, the cultural exchanges (or lack thereof, and often promoted by Confucius Institutes) and the difference in approach between Moscow and Beijing, all of which we discuss on the episode.
\\n
\\n
On China\\u2019s usurpation of Russia in the region, it\\u2019s striking that some public opinion is deeply suspicious of the new power in the region, a general Sinophobia that crystallises in numerous conspiracy theories (for example that roads built by Chinese companies are specifically designed to the weight of Chinese tanks). Welcomed by governments keen to benefit from the economic clout of their neighbour, some Chinese companies end up trying to hide their presence to avoid the ire of the locals. Raffaello recounts that \\u2018there are some cities in Kazakhstan, particularly in the oil regions, where we know CNPC [China National Petroleum Corporation] is a big player, but we just couldn\\u2019t find evidence of them. You\\u2019d ask the locals \\u201cwhere are the CNPC guys\\u201d and they\\u2019d say \\u201cwe don\\u2019t know what you\\u2019re talking about\\u201d\\u2019.
\\n
\\n
But China\\u2019s influence is very much there. It remains a \\u2018huge lacuna in Western strategic thinking\\u2019 that cannot be ignored, Raffaello says. Tune in to get ahead on this next geopolitical hot topic.
\\n
\\nThis episode is sponsored by the SOAS China Institute. Buy tickets for their three day course on China and the media at www.spectator.co.uk/soas.
\\n
\\nLearn more about China\'s relationship with Afghanistan here: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/will-china-become-afghanistan-s-new-sponsor-\\n
'