Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
b'An alienated society divided into groups and classes suspicious of one another does not pose an especially great problem for an authoritarian regime that does not legitimize itself through fair elections. In contrast, democratic institutions presuppose a consensus about obeying common \\u201crules of the game\\u201d and rely on a culture of trust and reciprocity. For democratic consolidation, citizens must respect and participate in shared democratic institutions. For instance, they should trust courts as the final arbiters in adjudicating disputes and respect judicial decisions even if they disagree with them. They should also recognize results of elections, even if their favorite candidate loses.\\n\\u2013 Monika Nalepa,\\xa0Skeletons in the Closet:\\xa0Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe\\xa0(2010)\\nThis book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien r\\xe9gime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.\\nHere are Monika\\u2019s book recommendations and links to the articles mentioned in this interview:\\n\\nAnne Meng\\u2019s\\xa0Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes;\\n\\nBryn Rosenfeld\\u2019s\\xa0The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy;\\n\\nSergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman\\u2019s\\xa0Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century;\\n\\nMilena Ang and Monika Nalepa\\u2019s chapter\\xa0\\u2018What can Quantitative and Formal Models Teach us About Transitional Justice\\u2019\\n\\n\\nMonika Nalepa and Barbara Piotrowskaw\\u2019s article\\xa0\\u2018Clean sweep or picking out the \\u2018bad apples\\u2019: the logic of secret police purges with evidence from Post-Communist Poland\\u2019.\\n\\n\\n\\nSee also Professor Nalepa\\u2019s discussion with Miranda Melcher about her latest Cambridge University Press release -\\xa0After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability\\xa0on the NBN.\\nMonika Nalepa\\u2019s research focuses on transitional justice, parties and legislatures, and game-theoretic approaches to comparative politics. She teaches courses in game theory, comparative politics, and transitional justice at the University of Chicago.\\nKeith Krueger lectures part-time in the Sydney Business School at Shanghai University.\\nLearn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices\\nSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/law'