Blame seems both morally necessary and morally dicey. Necessary, because it appears to be a central part of holding others to account for wrongdoing. Dicey, because \u2013 in its standard forms \u2013 blame involves the expression of anger and aims to harm its target. What\u2019s more, our blaming practices appear to presuppose a kind of freewill that some argue is implausible. In any case, we are aware of the ways in which blaming can go wrong. Are we ever justified in blaming others?\nIn\xa0The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral Anger\xa0(Cambridge University Press 2022),\xa0Kelly McCormick\xa0defends blame. She develops a novel theory of how agents can\xa0deserve\xa0a certain kind of blame and answers a range of skeptical views that hold that, as the relevant concept of desert should be jettisoned, no one deserves blame. Along the way, McCormick introduces a range of insightful methodological considerations that help us navigate the debate.\nRobert Talisse\xa0is the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.\nLearn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices\nSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/law