It is commonly assumed that states have a right to broad discretionary control over immigration, and that they may decide almost in any way they choose, who may stay within the territory and who must leave.\xa0 But even supposing that there is such a right, we may ask the decidedly moral question about how it may be exercised.\xa0 And this query calls us to try to bring our views about the ethics of immigration into equilibrium with our other moral convictions about citizenship, liberty, and equality.\xa0 \xa0Can our common views and practices concerning immigration be rendered consistent with these deeper commitments?\n\nIn The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013), Joseph Carens argues that our common commitment to democratic principles requires us to revise much of our thinking about immigration.\xa0 Beginning with the uncontroversial practice of granting citizenship immediately to those born within a country\u2019s territory, Carens argues that claims to social membership and thus to citizenship strengthen as individuals stay in a state; consequently, there is a point at which not extending citizenship to those living within a state\u2019s borders is grossly immoral, even for those who have settled without the state\u2019s permission.\xa0 Carens\u2019 arguments about the moral constraints on the state\u2019s rights to exclude eventuate in an argument in favor of open borders.\nLearn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices\nSupport our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/law